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Evidence of signatures associated with cryptographic modes of operation is established. Motivated
by some analogies between cryptographic and dynamical systems, in particular with chaos theory, we
propose an algorithm based on Lyapunov exponents of discrete dynamical systems to estimate the
divergence among ciphertexts as the encryption algorithm is applied iteratively. The results allow
to distinguish among six modes of operation, namely ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR and PCBC
using DES, IDEA, TEA and XTEA block ciphers of 64 bits, as well as AES, RC6, Twofish, Seed,
Serpent and Camellia block ciphers of 128 bits. Furthermore, the proposed methodology enables a
classification of modes of operation of cryptographic systems according to their strength.
I. INTRODUCTION
The propagation and continuous flow of information
are of utter importance for the development of stable
economies throughout the world as they are a prerequi-
site for successful business transactions, short- and long-
range communication, and so on [1]. Often this infor-
mation has to be encrypted in such a way that it can
be safely transferred between the sender and recipient
without allowing others to read the information that
is present in such an encrypted message [2]. On the
other hand, malicious persons and organizations, but also
governmental organizations, are continuously striving to
break the key with which messages were encrypted be-
cause this might enable them to get those pieces of in-
formation that are needed to achieve their criminal, pro-
tective, or other goals [3, 4]. It is probably due to the
impact of Turing’s success in breaking the Enigma that
humanity became aware of the importance of cryptogra-
phy in general, and the vulnerability of ciphers more in
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particular [5].
Since this major breakthrough, the functioning of
the industrial, financial and public sector has become
strongly dependent on the advances of cryptography. For
instance, while the availability of worldwide networks has
enabled rapid dissemination of information, it has also
stimulated cryptographic innovations because a signifi-
cant share of this information may only be available to a
few parties. In this manner, technological progress dur-
ing the last decades has increased the need for secured
communication and transactions, information shielding,
and so on [3, 4].
In the last few decades, modern cryptography replaced
mechanical schemes with new computing models. This
modern focus influenced the classical design of ciphers
far beyond the original purpose. Nowadays, there are
two class of cryptographic algorithms depending on the
key: symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric encryption
algorithms use the same key for both encryption of plain-
text and decryption of ciphertext. This class of algorithm
is also divided into two categories: stream ciphers and
block ciphers. Block ciphers have gained wide popular-
ity since the introduction of the first adopted encryp-
tion: The Data Encryption Standard (DES) [6], in the
mid-1970s, yet nowadays this cipher is considered prone
to brute force attacks. To overcome this shortcoming
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2the International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) [7]
was designed in 1991 to replace DES. Ever since, there
has been a pursuit for the development of new algo-
rithms that meet the rising security expectations. In
1997, the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) [8] selected the official Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) among many competitors, namely Ser-
pent [9], Twofish [10], RC6 [11], Rijndael [12], etc.
To date, block ciphers are the most important ele-
ments in many cryptographic systems [3]. A block ci-
pher breaks a message into blocks of elements (bits) and
then encrypts one block (plaintext) at a time producing
its corresponding output block (ciphertext). However, a
block cipher by itself allows for the encryption of only
one block, such that it is recommended to use a mode
of operation in conjunction [13]. This mode of opera-
tion specifies a mechanism to improve the corresponding
block cipher, while encrypting all of the blocks, one by
one, as it goes along.
Motivated by the analogies between cryptographic and
dynamical systems, on the one hand, and the lack of a
means to discriminate between different modes of opera-
tion that can be used to encrypt a message with a block
cipher using a single key, on the other hand, we demon-
strate in this paper how Lyapunov exponents can be re-
lied upon for tackling this problem. More specifically,
by contemplating the whole of a cipher, ciphertext and
key as an utter discrete dynamical system, i.e., a cellular
automaton (CA), and by resorting to the notion of Lya-
punov exponents as they have been conceived for such
systems [14, 15], we show how these measures can be ex-
ploited to identify the mode of operation that was used
during the encryption process.
Although the cryptographic process of encrypting and
decrypting information does not constitute a dynamical
system as such, it has been reported that it is possible
to draw parallels between cryptographic and dynamical
systems [16–19]. Hence, drawing upon such parallels, we
have a means to exploit similar tools as the ones that have
been conceived in the framework of dynamical systems in
order to characterize cryptographic systems. Taking into
account that the stability of a dynamical system is gen-
erally acknowledged as its main characteristic because it
gives insight into its intrinsic nature [20, 21], it is natural
to verify whether the dynamical systems viewpoint of a
cryptographic system allows for a similar notion in order
to better understand the latter. An exploration of this
is further motivated by the fact that several researchers
have noticed a close resemblance between a cryptographic
system on the one hand, and a chaotic system, on the
other hand [22–25], and the large number of chaos-based
cryptosystems [26, 27].
Classically, the stability of a dynamical system is as-
sessed by computing its so-called largest Lyapunov expo-
nent that quantifies how it behaves if it is evolved from
two different but close initial conditions [20]. Either the
corresponding phase space trajectories diverge or con-
verge in which case we refer to the system as unstable
or asymptotically stable, respectively, or the system is
conservative, which means that the initial separation re-
mains.
As the fields of cryptography and dynamical systems
are not yet strongly interwoven, the basic definitions and
concepts that relate to those systems and that are of
interest within the framework of this paper are presented
in Section II, while the dynamical systems viewpoint on
cryptographic systems is presented in Section III together
with the proposed method for identifying the underlying
mode of operation. Finally, the strengths of the proposed
method are illustrated and discussed in Section IV by
means of computer experiments.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we introduce the specificities of both
cryptographic and dynamical systems that are indispens-
able for a clear understanding this paper.
A. Block ciphers and modes of operation
Classically, an encryption system encloses three major
components, namely a cipher, a key, and finally, a cipher-
text. The former constitutes a sequence of instructions
that must be executed in order to encrypt a given plain-
text, which may be envisaged as a sequence of N bits,
such that it can be represented as a Boolean vector P of
length N . The result of this encryption process using a
key K, which is a sequence of k bits, is a so-called cipher-
text, which may be represented in a similar fashion as a
Boolean vector C of length N [3].
Of course, the real plaintext size varies and is mostly
different from the length of the blocks for which a block
cipher is designed. Consequently, common ciphers can-
not be applied directly for the encryption of arbitrary-
length plaintext [28]. In order to overcome this issue,
so-called block ciphers have been designed and imple-
mented. A block cipher slices the plaintext of length N
into b blocks of n bits, after which each of these blocks is
encrypted/decrypted by a block cipher, denoted as EK
and E−1K , respectively. Mathematically, the encryption
of a plaintext P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pb) of length n into a
ciphertext of the same length can be formalized as C =
E(K,P) = EK(P), where E : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
If the length N of the plaintext is not a whole multiple
of b, additional bits are padded to the last block of the
plaintext.
These block ciphers encrypt a plaintext in accordance
with a well-defined procedure, which is commonly re-
ferred to as the mode of operation of a block cipher. A
block cipher encrypts one block at a time, and it is the
mode of operation that allows a block cipher to encrypt
blocks consecutively in a secure way. Most of them use
an initialization vector (IV), denoted γ, which adds ran-
domness to the encryption process [3]. For instance, the
3counter mode uses a special method for generating coun-
ters in order to guarantee that each block in the sequence
is different from every other block [13].
From the many block ciphers currently available, we
will focus on the well-studied ones, being DES [6] (n =
64, k = 56), IDEA [7], TEA [29] and XTEA [30] (n = 64,
k = 128), as well as AES [12], RC6 [11], Twofish [10], Ser-
pent [9], Seed [31] and Camellia [32] (n = 128, k = 128).
The specifications of these block ciphers and the modes
of operation are public, so they can be implemented [13].
In 2001 the NIST compiled and recommended five
modes of operation—most of them were developed 30
years ago—to be used with a block cipher, namely
the Electronic Codebook (ECB), Cipher Block Chain-
ing (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feedback
(OFB), and Counter (CTR) modes [13]. In addition to
these NIST modes, there are many others, among which
the Propagating Cipher-Block Chaining (PCBC) [3]
mode will be considered in this paper.
Mathematically, the encryption of an arbitrary-length
plaintext by means of a block cipher in combination with
the ECB mode of operation can be formulated as:
Cj = EK(Pj) , j = 1, 2, . . . , b, (1)
where Cj represents the encrypted counterpart of the j-
th block of plaintext Pj . Similarly, the formalism for the
CBC mode is given by
Cj = EK(Cj−1 ⊕ Pj) , j = 1, 2, . . . , b, (2)
where ⊕ is the mod 2 operator and C0 = γ. For the OFB
mode one may write:
Cj = Pj ⊕Oj−1 , j = 1, 2, . . . , b, (3)
where Oj = EK(Oj−1) with O0 = EK(γ) and γ is ran-
domly selected from {0, 1}n. Table I lists the formulas
for the other modes of operation that are considered in
this paper.
In the remainder, a mode of operation of a block ci-
pher is denoted as MEK : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}N , which
maps a given plaintext P of length N to a correspond-
ing ciphertext C of equal length, so that we may write
C = MEK (P). In order to clarify the functioning of
a cryptographic system, we show in Fig. 1 a crypto-
graphic system with b = 2 blocks of n = 3 bits that
TABLE I: Mathematical representation of the CFB,
CTR and PCBC modes.
CFB CTR PCBC
Cj = Pj ⊕ EK(Cj−1)
C1 = P1 ⊕ EK(γ)
Cj = Pj ⊕Oj
Oj =EK(αj)
αj = rand(αj−1)
α1 = γ
Cj =EK(Pj ⊕ Pj−1 ⊕ Cj−1)
C1 =EK(P1 ⊕ γ)
1
uses the CBC mode of operation. We consider an ex-
emplary plaintext P = (P1, P2), for which it holds that
P1 = 010, P2 = 001 and γ = 101. Note that the outputs
generated by EK are chosen only for illustration, e.g.,
C1 = EK(C0⊕P1) = EK(111) = 100. We can see clearly
that a single application of the function MEK consists of
b applications of EK since the latter has to be applied to
each of the plaintext blocks Pj in order to construct the
ciphertext C.
t = 0 t = 1
C0 = γ = [101 ]
P = [010, 001]
C1 = EK(101 ⊕ 010) = 100
C2 = EK(100 ⊕ 001) = 000
C = MEK (P) = [100, 000]
FIG. 1: Example of the CBC mode of operation with
b = 2 blocks, n = 3 bits and block cipher EK .
B. Analogies between cryptographic and
dynamical systems
Although cryptographic systems, as the ones given by
Eqs. (1)–(3) and those listed in Table I, do not constitute
dynamical systems, we can draw some parallels between
both types of system, which might enable us to gain a
deeper understanding of the former [16, 17, 22, 24]. More
specifically, we may envisage such a cryptographic system
as a one-dimensional CA, which can be represented by
means of a triplet 〈T , S,Ψ〉. The first element of this
triplet refers to a one-dimensional array of ‘cells’ ci, each
of which bears one of the states enclosed in the finite
set S = {0, 1}, and which are updated at discrete time
steps by means of a global transition function Ψ. The
state of the i-th cell in T at the t-th time step will be
denoted as s(ci, t). Essentially, upon putting Ψ ≡ MEK ,
a mode of operation MEK may be envisaged as such a
global transition function.
Finally, we identify a given plaintext P with s(·, 0) in
such a way that the i-th bit of the j-th block in P is
denoted as s(cji , 0). The transition function MEK may
be applied iteratively so that a distinct ciphertext Ct is
evolved at every time step t. As such, a cryptographic
system can be transformed into a CA, and we may write
s(·, t+ 1) = MEK (s(·, t)) , (4)
or equivalently, Ct+1 = MEK (C
t), where C1 = MEK (P).
In Fig. 2 we show an illustration of the CBC mode of
operation by using Eq. (4) for the first two time steps
in the evolution of its corresponding CA. Note that text
styling has been added to make the effect of the mode
of operation tractable, and also, that the same plaintext
4t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
C0 = γ = [101 ]
P = [010, 001]
C10 = γ = [101 ]
C11 = EK(101 ⊕ 010) = 100
C12 = EK(100 ⊕ 001) = 000
C1 = MEK (P) = [100, 000]
γ = C20 = C
1
2 = [000]
C11 = EK(000⊕ 100) = 011
C12 = EK(011 ⊕ 000) = 111
C1 = MEK (P) = [011, 111]
FIG. 2: Example of the CBC mode of operation evolving over time with b = 2 blocks, n = 3 bits and block cipher
EK .
and γ values are used as the ones given in Fig. 1. As the
mode of operation is applied iteratively, at every con-
secutive time step γ is put equal to Ctb because one has
to select a new point in phase space that is the closest
to the reference direction, which basically constitutes an
orientation of the new initial configuration Ct+10 into the
direction of Ctb. For reasons of uniformity, γ is the only
parameter that can contain this initial configuration.
Recently, sundry methods have been developed to un-
ravel the dynamical properties of utter discrete dynam-
ical systems such as CA [14, 15, 33–35]. As such, by
relying on these for grasping the dynamics of a crypto-
graphic system’s corresponding CA, we might be able
to gain deeper insight into the dynamics of the former.
More specifically, we will show in the remainder of this
paper how Lyapunov exponents of CAs may be relied
upon for identifying the mode of operation of the under-
lying cryptographic systems, in the same way as these
measures have shown their usefulness for characterizing
utter discrete dynamical systems [14, 15, 36, 37].
III. A CELLULAR AUTOMATON VIEW ON
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS
Suppose that the CA counterpart of a given crypto-
graphic system G = 〈C,P,MEK 〉 is denoted as C. We can
investigate the dynamics of the former in general, and its
stability more in particular, by computing its so-called
Lyapunov exponent, which quantifies how the dynami-
cal system behaves in the long run if it is evolved from
two close initial conditions. Clearly, in our setting, this
means that we will assess the sensitivity of the equivalent
CA C to a small perturbation of the plaintext since we
put s(·, 0) = P. Hence, this should yield insights into the
behaviour of the cryptographic system if the plaintext is
perturbed.
Taking into account that the smallest possible pertur-
bation in such a two-state setting boils down to flipping
one bit of the first block of the plaintext P, P1 constitutes
the most influential block (initial condition) to the mode
of operation. Besides, it holds that the initial damage
vector h(·, 0) = P⊕P∗, where ⊕ is the mod 2 operator,
contains only one non-zero element. In the remainder, a
cell cji for which holds that h(c
j
i , 0) = 1 will be referred
to as a defective cell. After pinning down a plaintext
P and its perturbed version P∗ that fulfills the latter
criterion, we can evolve the equivalent CA C from both
s(·, 0) = P and s∗(·, 0) = P∗ for one time step in order
to obtain s(·, 1) and s∗(·, 1). Here, it should be recalled
that one time step in the evolution of a CA corresponds
to one application of the mode of operation MEK , which
involves the update of several blocks. Having updated
all the blocks, we can compute the damage vector at the
first time step
h(cji , 1) =
{
1 if s∗(cji , 1) 6= s(cji , 1),
0, else.
Consequently, the total number of defects at the first
time step can be computed as
1 =
b∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
h(cji , 1) . (5)
At this point, the reader might think that the damage
vector during subsequent time steps should be computed
similarly, but this is certainly not the case because one
would then neglect the fact that the defects can cancel
out each other due to the discrete nature of the CA’s state
space [14, 15]. The discrepancy between the number of
defective cells and the number of defects is not yet clear
after the first time step because every defective cell at
t = 1 traces back to the same initial defective cell.
However, as soon as the CA is evolved one more time
step, a discrepancy emerges between these quantities.
This can be understood by explicitly tracking all possible
pathways along which defects at t = 1 may propagate and
accumulate during one subsequent time step (see Fig. 3).
It is interesting to have a closer look at how nine defects
can arise at the second time step in the evolution of the
CA notwithstanding there are only five defective cells,
which should be contributed to the fact that several of
them may enclose multiple defects due to the existence
of several pathways along which defects can propagate.
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FIG. 3: Maximal propagation of defects (black) in
evolution space of a CA together with all possible
pathways along which defects can propagate (arrows).
Taking into consideration this reasoning, the correct
number of defects at the t-th time step, denoted t, should
be computed in accordance with the following six-step
procedure.
1. Let the cryptographic system evolve for one time
step, i.e., C1 = MEK (P), and analogously for its
perturbed version C1∗ = MEK (P
∗), both using the
same initialization vector γ.
2. Calculate the damage vector h1 given by Eq. (5)
and set the initialization vector as the last block
calculated for both versions, i.e., γ = C1b and γ
∗ =
C1b , as explained in Section II B.
3. For every cji for which h(c
j
i , 1) = 1, create a replica
Rji such that R
j
i (c
j
i , 1) = s
∗(cji , 1) = s(c
j
i , 1), where
s(cji , 1) is the Boolean complement of s(c
j
i , 1), and
Rji (c
j
q, 1) = s(c
j
q, 1), for every c
j
q 6= cji . Use the set
A1 to store these replicas.
4. Let the cryptographic system evolve one more time
step, i.e., compute s(·, 2) and R(·, 2), which boils
down to evaluating MEK (R
j
i ) with the same γ
∗ for
all replicas R ∈ A1.
5. Calculate the total number of defects at the second
time step as follows:
2 =
∑
Rji∈A1
b∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
h(cji , 2) (6)
and set the initialization vector as the last block
calculated for both versions, i.e., γ = C2b and γ
∗ =
C2b .
6. For every cji and R ∈ A1 for which R(cji , 2) 6=
s(cji , 2), create a replica R
j
i such that R
j
i (c
j
i , 2) =
s(cji , 2) and R
j
i (c
j
q, 2) = s(c
j
q, 2) for every c
j
q 6= cji .
Use a multiset A2 to store these replicas.
7. Repeat steps (4)–(6) in every subsequent time step
t+ 1 in order to assemble h(·, t+ 1) and At+1.
After computing the number of defects t at every con-
secutive time step t, the rate of divergence/convergence
of initially close phase space trajectories λ(t) of a CA C
can be obtained from:
λ(t) =
1
t
log
(
t
0
)
, (7)
with its limit value
λ = lim
t→∞λ(t) , (8)
generally referred to as the maximum Lyapunov expo-
nent (MLE) of C. In the framework of cryptographic sys-
tems, λ(t) quantifies how ciphertexts, which are obtained
by iteratively encrypting two close plaintexts P and P∗,
behave (converge/diverge) as the number of time steps
grows. As indicated in papers on the LE of CAs, one can
derive a theoretical upper bound on these LEs, which has
shown to depend on the number of neighbours [14, 15].
Calling to mind Shannon’s idea of diffusion, which is
related to the avalanche effect and states that a slight
change of the plaintext gives in worst case rise an entirely
different ciphertext, we are able to derive a theoretical
upper bound on the MLE of cryptographic systems. For
instance, consider the plaintext P = 10101101 and its
perturbed version P∗ = 10101100, as well as their en-
cryption EK(P) = 10101000 and EK(P
∗) = 01010111,
respectively. In the worst case scenario, the number of
differences may be at most 8, which is the length of the
plaintext N . This means that a defect in cji at the t-th
time step can at most propagate to N bits at the subse-
quent time step. Therefore, a mean-field approximation
of the upper bound λm for the cryptographic systems
becomes
λm =
1
t
log(λt) = log(N) = log(bn). (9)
Obviously, the higher the number of blocks b, the higher
the upper bound becomes.
Before turning to the experimental section of this pa-
per, we illustrate in Fig. 4 the procedure by which the LE
of a mode of operation MEK can be assessed. Note that
we employed the same plaintext as in Fig. 2. By mov-
ing along this table’s rows, we see the plaintexts that
are encrypted by repeatedly applying the mode of opera-
tion MEK . Note that some replicas are repeated as soon
as the system is evolved for one time step, which is in
agreement with the findings reported in Fig. 3.
In order to avoid having to keep track of all path-
ways individually, one can optimize the algorithm by just
counting every unique replica once and keeping track of
its multiplicity. For example, at t = 2 the replica R12
would be repeated twice, then at the subsequent time
step this replica has two cell defects, which means four
pathways in total at t = 3. As such, by tracking the mul-
tiplicity of every defect rather than every defect itself,
the efficiency of the algorithm increases substantially.
6P = [010, 001]
C1 (P) [100, 000]
C0 = [101]
…
C2 (C1 [011, 111]
C1*= ( P*) = [111, 010]
P* = [01 , 001]
=[110,000] R1 =[101,000] R2 =[100,010]
( ) = [001, 101]
1= 3
( ) = [001, 111]
( ) = [010, 110]
2= 5
R1=[001,111]
R2=[011,101]
R1=[010,111]
R2=[011,110]
C3 = (C2 ) [010,011] ((
(
(
3= 2 ˟ 2+1+2= 7
C0 = * [101]
MEK
0= 11
Timesteps Original plaintext Perturbed version P P* # defects
R12 3 2
2
2
3
3
R12
R13
R22
R12
R22
R13
R23
= =
MEK=
MEK=
MEK
)
=
=
=
MEK
MEK
MEK
MEKMEK
MEKMEK
)
)
)
)
[110,010]
1,011]
101]
0,011]
[01
[010,
[01
=
=
=
=
2˟
R1=[110,011]
R2=[010,010]
R1=[011,011]
R2=[010,111]
1
3
3
3
2˟
R2=[010,001]2
2˟
FIG. 4: Illustration of the
calculation of the LE for a
generic mode of operation and
block cipher with b = 2 blocks
and n = 3 bits.
If the cryptographic system is sensitive to the plain-
text from which it is evolved, the number of defects t
increases exponentially during its evolution, such that
t > 0, and consequently, λ > 0. On the other hand,
the system should be referred to as insensitive to the
underlying plaintext if the initial defect vanishes as the
number of time steps increases. Such a situation implies
that λ = −∞ owing to the discrete nature of a CA’s
state space. Since cryptographic systems are designed in
such a way that small changes in the plaintext give rise
to substantially differing ciphertexts, it should not come
as a surprise if λ would be positive for all the modes of
operation at stake in this paper. Still, the numerically
assessed values of λ(t) might differ significantly among
different block ciphers and/or underlying modes of oper-
ation, such that they may still be used to discriminate
between different modes of operation. This usage will be
illustrated in the following section.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
To demonstrate the effectivity of the above method-
ology, we considered two groups of block ciphers on the
basis of their block length n. The first group encloses the
64-block ciphers, namely DES [6], IDEA [7], TEA [29]
and XTEA [30], which all use a k = 64 key except for
DES that uses a key of length of k = 56 bits. The sec-
ond group of block ciphers is composed of 128-block ci-
phers with key of k = 128 bits: AES [12], RC6 [11],
Twofish [10], Serpent [9], Seed [31] and Camellia [32].
These ten block ciphers were adapted in such a way
that they took the plaintext P, the key K and the ini-
tialization vector γ as input variables. Moreover, these
block ciphers were implemented with a predefined num-
ber of rounds, each of which consist of several inner steps
in the course of an encryption process and they depend
on the specific algorithm [3]. We considered eight rounds
for IDEA, eighteen for DES, and thirty-two rounds for
both TEA and XTEA. Further, ten rounds for AES,
sixteen for both Twofish and Seed, eighteen for Camel-
lia and thirty-two for Serpent. Finally, we implemented
the modes of operation in accordance with the formalism
given by Eqs. (1)–(3) for ECB, CBC and OFB, and in
Table I for CFB, CTR and PCBC.
A. The dataset
To ensure the representativity of the computed Lya-
punov exponents, we computed the average λ-values that
were obtained when the CAs were evolved from differ-
ent plaintexts. Hence, the λ-values reported in the re-
mainder represent averages calculated over an ensemble
E = {eP | e = 1, . . . , 200} of 200 randomly generated
plaintexts eP and their perturbed versions eP
∗, which
were obtained by flipping only one bit in the first block
of eP.
Since such an ensemble was constructed for each of the
concerned cryptographic systems, by mutually combining
the underlying block cipher and the mode of operation,
we considered a total of 60 combinations, i.e., ten block
ciphers and six modes of operation. Consequently, a total
of 12000 plaintexts were generated randomly.
Similarly, the key K and the initialization vector γ
were generated randomly in order to avoid both key rep-
etitions and weak keys, which is a recommendation in
cryptography [38]. In the remainder, we refer to the as-
sembly of the 200 randomly generated plaintexts, keys
and initialization vectors as the cryptographic dataset
per cipher and mode of operation. Given that the block
ciphers encrypt a plaintext by splitting it into a num-
ber of blocks and subsequently transcribing every block,
the plaintexts were generated in such a way that they
were composed of the same number of b blocks, irrespec-
7tive of the type of block cipher. Note that this implies
a plaintext containing N = b × 64 bits in case of the
64-block ciphers and N = b × 128 bits in case of the
128-block ciphers. Thus, in order to compare λ-values of
64- and 128-block ciphers, we normalized the numerically
obtained λ with respect to λm obtained from Eq. (9),
B. Lyapunov exponents for the modes of operation
We assessed λ(t) for the CA counterpart of each of
the concerned cryptographic systems. For that purpose,
the equivalent CAs were evolved for t = 200 time steps,
which was sufficiently long because λ(t) showed conver-
gence in such a way that |λ(t)− λ(t+ 1)| < 1.19× 10−4,
being the maximum discrepancy between λ(t) and λ(t+1)
at the end of the simulation.
Furthermore the consistency of the λ-values across the
members of the different ensembles is also demonstrated
in Fig. 5 (a), which depicts the frequency distribution of
the standard deviation σλ (base 10 logarithm) of λ200 cal-
culated for the 60 cryptographic systems at stake. This
histogram shows the similarity of λ across the different
plaintexts, as the standard deviation that comes along
with the average MLE for the different cryptographic sys-
tems is obviously small.
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FIG. 5: (a) Frequency distribution of the standard
deviation σλ (base 10 logarithm) of λ200 calculated over
the 60 combinations of cryptographic systems. (b)
Frequency distribution of ∆ = max({eP | e =
1, . . . , 200})−min({eP | e = 1, . . . , 200}).
Fig. 5 (b) shows a histogram of the discrepancies
between the maximum and minimum observed MLE
among the members of the ensemble E, denoted by ∆ =
max({eP | e = 1, . . . , 200})−min({eP | e = 1, . . . , 200}).
The ∆-values obtained for the investigated datasets
lie between 3.99 × 10−5 and 4.79 × 10−3. The maxi-
mum and minimum ∆ correspond, respectively, to the
pairs of modes of operation with underlying block cipher:
IDEA-OFB and Serpent-CFB. All together, these small
discrepancies demonstrate once more that the λ-values
are highly consistent across the different plaintexts within
the ensemble E, such that we may draw conclusions on
their average values.
For simplicity, we mainly restrict our attention to
IDEA and AES as representative members of the fami-
lies of 64- and 128-block ciphers (see Fig. 6), respectively,
since similar results were obtained for the other block ci-
phers in the same families (see Fig. 7). These figures de-
pict the LE curves for all the modes of operation versus
the number of time steps—note that the standard devia-
tion of each curve is not shown since they are very small.
Taking into account Eq. (9), the upper bound for the
64-block ciphers is λm = log(N) = log(320) ≈ 5.76832,
while it is λm = log(640) ≈ 6.46147 for the 128-block
ciphers were employed to normalize the λ-values, respec-
tively.
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FIG. 6: Lyapunov exponent versus the number of time
steps for different modes of operation, being ECB,
CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR and PCBC, using the (a) IDEA
64-block cipher and (b) AES 128-block cipher. The
curves represent the average LE λ over 200 initial
plaintexts during t = 200 times steps, which are
normalized with respect to λm obtained from Eq. (9).
From both figures, it is quite easy to discriminate be-
tween the modes of operation, except for the overlapping
curves of CTR and OFB. It is interesting to have a closer
look at how their corresponding LE increases almost ex-
ponentially during the first few time steps. This be-
haviour can be explained by reconsidering the equations
in Table I. Indeed, CTR uses an inner pseudo-random
number generator and OFB uses a new initialization vec-
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FIG. 7: Lyapunov exponent versus the
number of time steps for different
modes of operation, being ECB, CBC,
OFB, CFB, CTR and PCBC using
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Twofish, Seed, Serpent and Camellia
with b = 5 blocks and n = 64 bits. The
curves represent the average LE λ over
200 initial plaintexts during t = 200
time steps, which are normalized with
respect to λm obtained from Eq. (9)
tor at every time step, such that the number of defective
cells will not only increase due to discrepancies natu-
rally emerging between the plaintexts, but also due to
the additional defects introduced through these random
processes. In contrast, CFB displays the opposite effect,
i.e., its curve decays exponentially.
Further, the Lyapunov exponents of ECB and PCBC
are constant, since the number of defective cells grows
proportionally through time. For instance, this be-
haviour can be explained by considering that ECB at-
tains λ200 = 3.46565 ± 1.35 × 10−3 with the IDEA
block cipher, which means that the number of defects
t = e
(λ200) = 31.99728 ± 4.32 × 10−2 equals approxi-
mately n/2, being almost 50% of the block length. The
same behaviour occurs for the AES block cipher, where
e(λ200) = 63.994055± 4.29× 10−2.
The original values of the exponents and standard devi-
ation found at the end of the simulation are summarized
in Table II. Furthermore, we can discriminate between
modes of operation in families of block ciphers not only
9TABLE II: MLE λ200 and standard deviation (×10−3) for the (a) 64- and (b) 128-block ciphers.
(a)
λ200 IDEA DES TEA XTEA
ECB 3.46565 ± 1.35 3.46570 ± 1.27 3.46554 ± 1.23 3.46564 ± 1.25
OFB 5.04796 ± 4.00 5.04800 ± 3.89 5.04817 ± 3.87 5.04816 ± 3.68
CBC 3.55597 ± 0.96 3.55598 ± 0.93 3.55596 ± 0.81 3.55598 ± 0.88
CTR 5.04817 ± 3.55 5.04818 ± 3.81 5.04853 ± 4.14 5.04787 ± 4.15
CFB 0.15925 ± 0.07 0.15925 ± 0.07 0.15926 ± 0.06 0.15925 ± 0.07
PCBC 5.07496 ± 1.91 5.07465 ± 2.01 5.07467 ± 1.91 5.07451 ± 1.87
(b)
λ200 AES RC6 Twofish Seed Serpent Camellia
ECB 4.15879 ± 0.67 4.15885 ± 0.75 4.15876 ± 0.68 4.15887 ± 0.7 4.15887 ± 0.75 4.15884 ± 0.76
OFB 5.73875 ± 2.82 5.73879 ± 2.96 5.73869 ± 2.86 5.73860 ± 2.84 5.73840 ± 2.82 5.73885 ± 3.02
CBC 4.24921 ± 0.52 4.24913 ± 0.56 4.24920 ± 0.56 4.24915 ± 0.51 4.24919 ± 0.56 4.24920 ± 0.55
CTR 5.73891 ± 2.83 5.73876 ± 2.70 5.73882 ± 2.79 5.73904 ± 2.78 5.73866 ± 2.74 5.73871 ± 2.81
CFB 0.17311 ± 0.05 0.17311 ± 0.05 0.17311 ± 0.05 0.17311 ± 0.05 0.17311 ± 0.05 0.17311 ± 0.05
PCBC 5.76812 ± 1.31 5.76815 ± 1.27 5.76792 ± 1.37 5.76816 ± 1.40 5.76792 ± 1.38 5.76806 ± 1.30
by visual inspection of the graphs, but also by means
of statistical tests to demonstrate it. Paired t-tests re-
vealed that there are statistically significant differences
between ECB, CBC, CFB and PCBC mutually at the
5% significance level. However, no statistically signifi-
cant difference was found between CTR and OFB. These
observations were found in both families of 64- and 128-
block ciphers, which also allows the proposed method to
discriminate between modes of operation of different fam-
ilies, for instance, IDEA-CTR can be distinguished from
AES-CTR.
Moreover, by means of the washer method [39], we an-
alyzed statistically whether a curve (for one of the ensem-
ble’s members) for a given mode falls within the envelope
of curves obtained for the entire ensemble for another
mode of operation. This procedure was repeated for all
the curves within the given mode of operation at the
5% significance level, which indicated that at most 6.4%
and 11.1% of the observations of the 64- and 128-block
ciphers constituted outliers. These outliers exist at the
beginning of the simulation. We can also notice that the
CFB curve behaves completely different from the other
ones (non overlapping and not too close), which means
that the CFB falls outside of the range of the LE for the
other modes of operation.
C. Analysis of the LE of cryptographic systems
In this section, we will examine and discuss the pre-
ceding results in more detail.
a. Initial conditions P and P∗ Recalling that
an assessment of the Lyapunov exponent involves track-
ing the CA evolution from two initial configurations for
which it holds that h(·, 0) = P ⊕ P∗ and given the fact
that we are dealing with Booleans, the smallest possi-
ble perturbation in such a setting implies flipping the
right-most bit of the plaintext. However, we observed
that the position of the flipped bit does not affect the
numerical value of the Lyapunov exponent, which can be
understood by recalling the theoretical upper bound on
the Lyapunov exponent of cryptographic systems. In-
deed, the encryption of the plaintext with a bit flipped
at an arbitrary x position at the first plaintext block
(1 ≤ x ≤ n) may, in the worst case, affect all the bits of
the ciphertext.
b. Cryptographic signatures From Figs. 6–7 it
should be noticed that the normalized λ-values do not
attain 1, because none of the cryptographic systems at
stake is attaining the worst case scenario mentioned in
Section III. This can be explained by the fact that this
is an ideal and desirable “scenario” for cryptographic
systems and that the block ciphers at stake have their
limitations. Furthermore, we found an unexpected phe-
nomenon with regard to the families of 64- and 128-block
ciphers. A closer look at the curves tied up with these
families shows that, in fact, we can also differentiate be-
tween block cipher families.
c. Number of blocks In order to investigate the
importance of the number of blocks b, we computed the
Lyapunov exponents for the same cryptographic systems
but with 2, 4, 8, . . . , 20 blocks. In Fig. 8 one can see the
LE curves for each mode of operation using the IDEA
block cipher as a function of b. From this figure it is
clear that each curve is somehow lifted upwards with the
number of blocks b.
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From Eq. (9), it is expected to get higher λ-values when
the length of the plaintext increases. In fact, this occurs
for all the modes of operation at stake, except for ECB. In
particular, this indicates that irrespective of the number
of blocks b of the plaintext, the ECB’s number of defects
will attain approximately n/2, which demonstrates that
the first block is the only one affected by the initial condi-
tions, while the other blocks do not spread defects. Fur-
thermore, we obtained the same results with both groups
of 64- and 128-block ciphers and the six modes of opera-
tion.
d. Empirical MLE In Section III we provided
some mathematical foundations to obtain the theoreti-
cal upper bound λm for cryptographic systems. How-
ever, the lack of an analytical upper bound for a specific
mode of operation is an important limitation remaining.
Perhaps, this limitation may seem contradictious to cryp-
tography aims, because it indicates to find an analytical
way to obtain the essence of a cryptographic system that
is designed to avoid this gap.
Here, we opted for an alternative approach, i.e., an
empirical estimation of the upper bound for the modes
of operation as a function of the number of blocks, based
on a multiple regression analysis, to gain a deeper insight
into the behaviour of the LE curves. In Fig. 9 we show
the MLE λ obtained as a function of b for the IDEA and
the corresponding regression curves (see also Fig. 10 for
the AES block cipher). The coefficients of determination
also demonstrate the strong influence by the number of
blocks b.
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e. Computational considerations Although the
algorithm has been enhanced with different strategies to
avoid tracking each individual defect, somehow the com-
putational cost of the proposed methodology is very high,
since the computational time dramatically increases as
the number of blocks of the plaintext P grows.
V. CONCLUSIONS
There is a strong relationship between cryptographic
systems and discrete dynamical systems. In this work we
have outlined an approach to envisage a cryptographic
system as an equivalent one-dimensional CA in order to
assess its stability characteristics by computing the Lya-
punov exponent of the cryptographic system. The pro-
posed method was capable of distinguishing six crypto-
graphic modes of operation, namely ECB, CBC, OFB,
CFB, CTR and PCBC using two families of block ci-
phers DES, IDEA, TEA and XTEA of 64 bits, as well
as AES, RC6, Twofish, Seed, Serpent and Camellia of
128 bits. Moreover, the proposed method is also capa-
ble of distinguishing between the two families of 64- and
128-block ciphers. The results showed that the Lyapunov
exponent evolution pattern is maintained for each mode
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of operation and this is independent of the block cipher
used.
We also provided a mathematical basis to obtain the
theoretical upper bound λm for the cryptographic sys-
tems. However, further work is required to theoretically
analyze the upper bound on the LE for each of the modes
of operation. Here we only used an empirical assessment
to fit the curves. Finally, our results suggest that even
modern and contemporary algorithms yield patterns that
should be explored. Thus, our theoretical framework may
offer a novel alternative to explore the weakness of these
cryptographic systems and may ultimately lead to a clas-
sification of these systems according to their strength.
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